On Watson's Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation

Watson (2002) proposes non-forcing contracts as a way to show the limitations of the mechanism design program with ex-post renegotiation (Maskin and Moore (1999)). If one takes a partial implementation approach, as Watson does, we show that non-forcing contracts do not constitute an intermediate paradigm between implementation with no renegotiation and with ex-post renegotiation. Moreover, taking a full implementation approach, non-forcing contracts fail if and only if one goes outside of the constraints identified by Maskin and Moore, because of the appearance of undesirable equilibria.Contracts, Renegotiation, Mechanism Design

On Watson's Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation

Watson (2007) proposes non-forcing contracts as a way to show the limitations of the mechanism design program with ex-post renegotia- tion (Maskin and Moore (1999)). If one takes a partial implementation approach, as Watson does, we show that non-forcing contracts do not con- stitute an intermediate paradigm between implementation with no renego- tiation and with ex-post renegotiation. Moreover, taking a full implemen- tation approach, non-forcing contracts fail if and only if one goes outside of the constraints identified by Maskin and Moore, because of the appearance of undesirable equilibria.contracts, renegotiation, mechanism design

Renegotiation of public private partnership road contracts: Issues and outcomes

The renegotiation of road projects has been an important issue that has generated concerns in PPP procurement over the last decade. This has had serious policy implications for public procurement policy across countries because of its implications for the achievement of the objectives defined at the inception of PPP road contracts. This paper assesses the renegotiation of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) infrastructure projects in order to identify the issues involved in renegotiation and its outcomes. Data were collected through a literature review of selected studies on PPP infrastructure projects on a sectoral basis with particular emphasis on Latin America, Portugal and Spain. It was revealed that a high proportion of PPP contracts in the transport sector are renegotiated: Indeed, in the transport sector, more PPP road projects are renegotiated than other forms of transport projects. The main factors surrounding the renegotiation of road contracts are: lack of an adequate contract design, frequent opportunistic behaviour on the part of both public and private partners during the implementation of PPP road projects, changes in the conditions affecting revenue and costs beyond the reasonable assumptions accounted for in the original contract, corruption, and political and economic instability, all of which in most instances reduce the chance of the public partner achieving its objective of value for money (VfM). The paper concludes with a discussion of the need to develop a framework for integrating considerations of value for money into the renegotiation process of PPP road contracts

IMPLEMENTATION WITH STATE DEPENDENT FEASIBLE SETS AND PREFERENCES: A RENEGOTIATION APPROACH

In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with a class of renegotiation functions that do not reward agents for unfeasibilities. This result is used to study the possibility of implementing the Walrasian Correspondence in exchange economies and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and bankruptcy.

Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent.

In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infeasible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renegotiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium in a class of reversion functions that punish agents for infeasibilities. This is used to study the implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and taxation.Teoría de juegos; Toma de decisiones; Economía del bienestar;

Unionization in a dynamic oligopolistic model of international trade.

The study of dynamic strategic behavior in international trade environments with imperfect factor markets (unions) yields significantly different policy implications compared to those that obtain under static settings. We find that contrary to static equilibria, the equilibrium of our model exhibits renegotiation-proofness; unilateral implementation of cost subsidies may yield negative domestic welfare effects; and trade policy tools are not useful in pursuing rent-shifting objectives.

Mechanism Design with Renegotiation and Costly Messages

The paper studies a general model of hold-up in a setting encompassing the models of Segal (1999) and Che and Hausch (1999) among others. It is shown that if renegotiation is modelled as an infinite-horizon non-cooperative bargaining game then, with a simple initial contract, an efficient equilibrium will generally exist. The contract gives authority to one party to set the terms of trade and gives the other party a non-expiring option to trade at these terms. The difference from standard results arises because the existing contract ensures that the renegotiation game has multiple equilibria; the multiplicity of continuation equilibria can be used to enforce efficient investment

NAFTA Renegotiation and Modernization

The 115th Congress faces policy issues related to the Trump Administration’s renegotiation and modernization of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA negotiations were first launched in 1992 under President H. W. Bush, who signed the agreement in December 1992, and continued under President Bill Clinton, who negotiated additional side agreements on labor and the environment. President Clinton signed the agreement into law on December 8 1993, (P.L. 103-182) and NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994. It is particularly significant because it was the most comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) negotiated at the time, contained several groundbreaking provisions, and was the first of a new generation of U.S. FTAs later negotiated. Congress played a major role during its consideration and, after contentious and comprehensive debate, ultimately approved legislation to implement the agreement. NAFTA established trade liberalization commitments that set new rules and disciplines for future FTAs on issues important to the United States, including intellectual property rights protection, services trade, dispute settlement procedures, investment, labor, and the environment. NAFTA’s market-opening provisions gradually eliminated nearly all tariff and most nontariff barriers on goods produced and traded within North America. At the time of NAFTA, average applied U.S. duties on imports from Mexico were 2.07%, while U.S. businesses faced average tariffs of 10%, in addition to nontariff and investment barriers, in Mexico. The U.S.-Canada FTA had been in effect since 1989. Trade among NAFTA partners has tripled since the agreement entered into force, forming a more integrated North American market. The Trump Administration has made NAFTA renegotiation and modernization a prominent initial priority of its trade policy. President Trump has viewed the agreement as the “worst trade deal,” and has stated that he may seek to withdraw from the agreement. He has focused on the trade deficit with Mexico as a major reason for his critique. On May 18, 2017, the Trump Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks to renegotiate NAFTA, as required by the 2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) (P.L. 114-26). Negotiations started August 16, 2017. Stating they are committed to an expeditious process, negotiators plan to have a series of seven rounds at three-week intervals for a conclusion by the end of 2017 or early 2018. The fourth round of negotiations began at the time this report was printed. The final text of the agreement will not be released until after negotiations are concluded. NAFTA parties have agreed that the information exchanged in the context of the negotiations, such as the negotiating text, proposals of each government, and other materials related to the substance of the negotiations, must remain confidential. Congress will likely continue to be a major participant in shaping and potentially considering an updated NAFTA. Key issues for Congress in regard to the renegotiation or modernization include the constitutional authority of Congress over international trade, its role in revising or withdrawing from the agreement, the U.S. negotiating objectives, the impact on U.S. industries and the U.S. economy, the negotiating objectives of Canada and Mexico, and the impact on broader relations with Canada and Mexico. The outcome of these negotiations will have implications for the future direction of U.S. trade policy under President Trump. NAFTA renegotiation may provide opportunities to address issues not covered in the original text. Technology and industrial production processes have changed significantly since it was negotiated. The widespread use of the Internet has affected economic activities and the use of e-commerce, for example. A modernization could incorporate elements of more recent U.S. FTAs, such as digital and services trade and enhanced IPR protection. Many U.S. manufacturers, services providers, and agricultural producers oppose efforts to eliminate NAFTA and ask that the Trump Administration strive to “do no harm” in the negotiations because they have much to lose if the United States pulls out of the agreement. Other groups contend that NAFTA should be rewritten to include stronger and more enforceable labor protections, provisions on currency manipulation, and stricter rules of origin

Contracts as threats: On a rationale for rewarding A while hoping for B

In this paper we explore theoretically the relationship between explicit and implicit/relational contracting distinguishing between the ex-ante decision to sign an explicit contract and the ex-post decision wheter to actually apply it. We show, among other things, that the relational efficient explicit contract tends to display overcontracting on tasks or qualitative requirements (A) that are verifiable but apparently of little use for the principal. The ex-post (non)implementation of such explicit contract can then be discretionally exchanged against the provision of non contractible tasks (B) that are highly valuable for the principal. An empirical implication of the result, consistent with casual observation in procurement, is that penalties for infringements established by explicit contracts are seldom exercised, even though violations take place and are easy to monitor and verify

Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation

This paper studies Nash implementation when the outcomes of the mechanism can be renegotiated among the agents but the planner does not know the renegotiation function that they will use. We characterize the social objectives that can be implemented in Nash equilibrium when the same mechanism must work for every admissible renegotiation function. The constrained Walrasian correspondence, the core correspondence, and the Pareto-efficient and envy-free correspondence satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for this form of implementation if and only if freedisposal of the commodities is allowed. The uniform rule, on the other hand, is not Nash implementable for some admissible renegotiations functions.Implementation theory, Nash equilibrium, renegotiation function.